Abstract

Against traditional interpretations, which claim either that Heidegger has rendered all accounts of subjectivity-and consequently of ethics-impossible, or, on the contrary, that Heidegger merely renews the modern metaphysics of subjectivity, Raffoul demonstrates how Heidegger's destruction/deconstruction of the subject opens the space for a radically nonsubjectivistic formulation of human being. Raffoul reconstitutes and analyzes Heidegger's debate with the great thinkers of subjectivity, in order to show that Heidegger's "destructive" reading of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity is, in fact, a positive reappropriation of the ontological foundations of the subject. Raffoul's recasting of Heidegger's work on human subjectivity should prove indispensable in future debates on the fate of the subject in the postmodern era.