Abstract

In this elegant, smoothly written book, David Carr provides nothing less than a defense of both Kantian and Husserlian versions of transcendental philosophy against Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics. Carr’s Paradox of Subjectivity is organized into four parts. In the first part, Carr provides a synopsis of Heidegger’s interpretation of traditional metaphysics. Part two is devoted to a reconstruction of Kant’s transcendental theory of subjectivity. The third part deals with Husserl’s conception of transcendental subjectivity. Finally, in part four, Carr proposes to show that, for both Kant and Husserl, transcendental subjectivity is a purely methodological implement, which cannot in turn be reified into serving the role traditionally reserved for metaphysical substance. Instead, transcendental subjectivity is to be understood as itself a critical regard of traditional metaphysics. Moreover, such a strictly methodological conception of transcendental subjectivity cannot be assimilated into Heidegger’s conception of metaphysics. Consequently, Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics cannot be extended as a critique of either Kant or Husserl