First-person authority and the internal reality of beliefs

In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the internal reality of beliefs. First-person authority (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press (1998)
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Diana Raffman
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

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What's Wrong with McKinsey-style Reasoning?James Pryor - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 177--200.

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