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Deflationism and gödel’s theorem – a comment on Gauker
Analysis 62 (1):85–87 (2002)
Abstract
In his recent article Christopher Gauker (2001) has presented a thoughtprovoking argument against deflationist theories of truth. More exactly, he attacks what he calls ‘T-schema deflationism’, that is, the claim that a theory of truth can simply take the form of certain instances of the T-schema.Author's Profile
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References found in this work
Truth.Paul Horwich - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 261-272.
Maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski’s schema.Vann McGee - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (3):235 - 241.
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