Deflationism, conservativeness and maximality

Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):695 - 705 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We discuss two desirable properties of deflationary truth theories: conservativeness and maximality. Joining them together, we obtain a notion of a maximal conservative truth theory - a theory which is conservative over its base, but can't be enlarged any further without losing its conservative character. There are indeed such theories; we show however that none of them is axiomatizable, and moreover, that there will be in fact continuum many theories of this sort. It turns out in effect that the deflationist still needs some additional principles, which would permit him to construct his preferred theory of truth

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Some Computationalconstraints In Epistemic Logic.Timothy Williamson - 2004 - In S. Rahman (ed.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 437--456.
Reliabilism and deflationism.James R. Beebe - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510.
Conservative theories of classical truth.Volker Halbach - 1999 - Studia Logica 62 (3):353-370.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
104 (#155,272)

6 months
3 (#445,838)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Cezary Cieslinski
University of Warsaw

Citations of this work

Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Relative truth definability of axiomatic truth theories.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2010 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):305-344.
Reducing compositional to disquotational truth.Volker Halbach - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):786-798.
Classical recapture and maximality.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1951-1970.
A Unified Theory of Truth and Paradox.Lorenzo Rossi - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):209-254.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Proof and Truth.Stewart Shapiro - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):493-521.
Proof and Truth.Stewart Shapiro - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):493-521.
Maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski’s schema.Vann McGee - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (3):235 - 241.
Deflating the conservativeness argument.Hartry Field - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):533-540.

View all 11 references / Add more references