Emotional consciousness: A neural model of how cognitive appraisal and somatic perception interact to produce qualitative experience

Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):811-834 (2008)
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Abstract

This paper proposes a theory of how conscious emotional experience is produced by the brain as the result of many interacting brain areas coordinated in working memory. These brain areas integrate perceptions of bodily states of an organism with cognitive appraisals of its current situation. Emotions are neural processes that represent the overall cognitive and somatic state of the organism. Conscious experience arises when neural representations achieve high activation as part of working memory. This theory explains numerous phenomena concerning emotional consciousness, including differentiation, integration, intensity, valence, and change. Ó 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved

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Paul Thagard
University of Waterloo

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Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

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