More neural than thou (reply to churchland)

In S. Ameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Ii: The 1996 Tucson Discussions and Debates. MIT Press (1998)
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Abstract

In "Brainshy: Non-neural theories of conscious experience," (this volume) Patricia Churchland considers three "non-neural" approaches to the puzzle of consciousness: 1) Chalmers' fundamental information, 2) Searle's "intrinsic" property of brain, and 3) Penrose-Hameroff quantum phenomena in microtubules. In rejecting these ideas, Churchland flies the flag of "neuralism." She claims that conscious experience will be totally and completely explained by the dynamical complexity of properties at the level of neurons and neural networks. As far as consciousness goes, neural network firing patterns triggered by axon-to-dendrite synaptic chemical transmissions are the fundamental correlates of consciousness. There is no need to look elsewhere

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A field theory of consciousness.E. Roy John - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):184-213.
A Cognitive Approach to Benacerraf's Dilemma.Luke Jerzykiewicz - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario

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