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Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity
Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):487-500 (2009)
Abstract
Persons have objective, not socially defined, identity conditions. I shall argue that robots do not, unless they have souls. Hence, robots without souls are not persons. And by parallel reasoning, neither are we persons if we do not have souls.Author's Profile
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References found in this work
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
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