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Computer processes and virtual persons: Comments on Cole's "artificial intelligence and personal identity"
Abstract
This is a draft of the written version of comments on a paper by David Cole, presented orally at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meeting in New Orleans, 27 April 1990. Following the written comments are 2 appendices: One contains a letter to Cole updating these comments. The other is the handout from the oral presentationAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
How Helen Keller Used Syntactic Semantics to Escape from a Chinese Room.William J. Rapaport - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):381-436.
Because mere calculating isn't thinking: Comments on Hauser's Why Isn't My Pocket Calculator a Thinking Thing?.William J. Rapaport - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):11-20.
Computers Are Syntax All the Way Down: Reply to Bozşahin.William J. Rapaport - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):227-237.
References found in this work
Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 1980 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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