Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception

Theoria 21 (2):133-145 (2010)
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Abstract

A significant part of perception is characterized by awareness of particular objects. Two ways of making precise this intuition have been proposed. The dispute’s argumentative context is reconstructed and a proposal is advanced that may be regarded as a compromise between the contenders.

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Olga Prat
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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