Causation and Negative Events

Filozofska Istrazivanja 42 (3):545-560 (2022)
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Abstract

The issue of responsibility is directly linked to the notion of causation because asserting legal and moral qualifications is dependent on it. The problem arises when negative events are introduced into the consideration of causation because they are part of structuring statements that speak to omission, inaction, or prevention. Hence, the question of can negative events represent a cause and/or effect is extremely important. Although negative events are most commonly treated in analogy with positive events and brought under genuine causation, this placement is unjustified because – unlike positive events – negative events are causally inert. This explanation reflects unfavourably on the practice of forming singular statements on causal connections to negative events. Despite this being the case, it does not render meaningless the common practice of formulating legitimate causal explanations that serve as grounds for statements on omission, inaction, or prevention.

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