Plans And Decisions

Theory and Decision 57 (2):79-107 (2004)
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Abstract

Counterexamples are constructed for classical decision theory, turning on the fact that actions must often be chosen in groups rather than individually, i.e., the objects of rational choice are plans. It is argued that there is no way to define optimality for plans that makes the finding of optimal plans the desideratum of rational decision-making. An alternative called “locally global planning” is proposed as a replacement for classical decision theory. Decision-making becomes a non-terminating process without a precise target rather than a terminating search for an optimal solution

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John Pollock
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Rational choice and action omnipotence.John L. Pollock - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):1-23.
Are Plans Necessary?Michael McDermott - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):225-232.

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Minimal Rationality.Christopher Cherniak - 1986 - MIT Press. Edited by Christopher Cherniak.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
Causal decision theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.

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