A resource-bounded agent addresses the newcomb problem

Synthese 176 (1):57-82 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the Newcomb problem, the standard arguments for taking either one box or both boxes adduce what seem to be relevant considerations, but they are not complete arguments, and attempts to complete the arguments rely upon incorrect principles of rational decision making. It is argued that by considering how the predictor is making his prediction, we can generate a more complete argument, and this in turn supports a form of causal decision theory

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Exploring the future with resource-bounded agents.Michael Fisher & Chiara Ghidini - 2009 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):3-21.
A Companion to Relativism.Steven D. Hales (ed.) - 2010 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Causal probability.John L. Pollock - 2002 - Synthese 132 (1-2):143 - 185.
A logic of strategic ability under bounded memory.Thomas Ågotnes & Dirk Walther - 2009 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):55-77.
What is an agent.Carol Rovane - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):181 - 198.
Problems of Philosophy Problem #12: Epistemology from a strategic viewpoint.[author unknown] - 1998 - Synthese 116 (1):113-113.
Causal Probability.John L. John L. - 2002 - Synthese 132 (1/2):143-185.
Problems of Philosophy.[author unknown] - 2000 - Synthese 124 (2):295-295.
Problems of Philosophy. Problem #4: Can Nature Impart to us General Truths?[author unknown] - 1997 - Synthese 113 (2):321-322.
Problems of Philosophy Problem #9: Reference vs. identification.[author unknown] - 1998 - Synthese 115 (1):141-141.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-02-26

Downloads
112 (#146,569)

6 months
7 (#176,166)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Pollock
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.
Causal decision theory.Paul Weirich - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Add more citations