Defending a Realist Stance

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science:1-15 (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Should the scientific realist admit that their realism involves what Chakravartty has called an epistemic stance? I argue that the realist should accept the need for a realist stance that licenses the use of inference to the best explanation. However, unlike Chakravartty, I maintain that the realist should insist that their realist stance is rationally obligatory. This requires an anti-voluntarism about stances that involves theoretical reasons for adopting one stance rather than another. I present one account of what these reasons might be that is tied to principles that identify some strong connections between evidence, knowledge and genuine explanation.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

21 (#762,344)

6 months
21 (#133,512)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Pincock
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Equal treatment for belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.
Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Against the New Evidentialists.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.
Deciding to believe.B. Williams - 1973 - In Bernard Williams (ed.), Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136–51.

View all 14 references / Add more references