In this series of dialogues, Derrida discusses and elaborates on some of the central themes of his work, such as the problems of genesis, justice, authorship and death. Combining autobiographical reflection with philosophical enquiry, Derrida illuminates the ideas that have characterized his thought from its beginning to the present day. If there is one feature that links these contributions, it is the theme of singularity - the uniqueness of the individual, the resistance of existence to philosophy, the temporality of the (...) singular and exceptional moment, and the problem of exemplarity. The second half of this book contains an essay by Maurizio Ferraris, in which he explores the questions of indication, time and the inscription of the transcendental in the empirical. A work of outstanding philosophy and scholarship, the essay is developed in close proximity to Derrida and in dialogue with figures such as Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Kant, Hegel and Heidegger. It thereby provides a useful introduction to the philosophy of one of Italy's most prominent philosophers as well as an excellent complement to Derrida's own ideas. A Taste for the Secret consists of material that has never before appeared in English. It will be of interest to second-year undergraduates, graduate students and academics in philosophy, modern languages, literature, literary theory and the humanities generally. (shrink)

Realitism: the postmodern attack on reality -- Realism: things that have existed since the beginning of the world -- Reconstruction: why criticism starts from reality -- Emancipation: unexamined life has no value.

Introduction to New Realism provides an overview of the movement of contemporary thought named New Realism, by its creator and most celebrated practitioner, Maurizio Ferraris. Sharing significant concerns and features with Speculative Realism and Object Oriented Ontology, New Realism can be said to be one of the most prescient philosophical positions today. Its desire to overcome the postmodern antirealism of Kantian origin, and to reassert the importance of truth and objectivity in the name of a new Enlightenment, has had an (...) enormous resonance both in Europe and in the US. Introduction to New Realism is the first volume dedicated to exposing this continental movement to an anglophone audience.Featuring a foreword by the eminent contemporary philosopher and leading exponent of Speculative Realism, Iain Hamilton Grant, the book begins by tracing the genesis of New Realism, and outlining its central theoretical tenets, before opening onto three distinct sections. The first, 'Negativity', is a critique of the postmodern idea that the world is constructed by our conceptual schemas, all the more so as we have entered the age of digitality and virtuality. The second thesis, 'positivity', proposes the fundamental ontological assertion of New Realism, namely that not only are there parts of reality that are independent of thought, but these parts are also able to act causally over thought and the human world. The third thesis, 'normativity,' applies New Realism to the sphere of the social world. Finally, an afterword written by two young scholars explains in more detail the relationship between New Realism and other forms of contemporary realism. (shrink)

In this article I defend two theses. The first is that the centrality of recording in the social world is manifested through the production of documents, a phenomenon which has been present since the earliest phases of society and which has undergone an exponential growth through the technological developments of the last decades. The second is that the centrality of documents leads to a view of normativity according to which human beings are primarily passive receptors of rules manifested through documents. (...) We are not intentional producers of values. The latter, as I shall suggest in my conclusion, should be viewed as being ‘socially dependent’ rather than ‘socially constructed’. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I assume that, if knowledge does not refer to something other than itself, the words ‘subject’, ‘object’, ‘epistemology’, ‘ontology’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘reflection’ would be meaningless. I define the transcendental fallacy as involving faith in the existence of a spirit independent from matter, capable of producing representations and things. In terms of matter and memory, the fact that the past is repeated by matter is even more important than the fact that it is recalled by memory, because without (...) matter there would be no memory and no ability to remember. I remind the reader that only individuals exist and that the first character of individuals is that they are external with respect to others. Finally, I consider how epistemology should be considered in terms of Pentecostal meaning and emergent meaning: Pentecostal meaning follows the path Meaning → Expression → Inscription. Emergent meaning goes from Inscription → Expression → Meaning. (shrink)

An analysis of the history and social role of mobile phones today is followed by a proposal of a philosophical theory of objects, which is meant to be complementary to Searle's 'collective intentionality', that places writing at the basis of social reality.

Il vero punto, nel confronto tra realisti e postmodernisti, non è ovviamente l’affermazione o negazione dell’esistenza del mondo esterno, ma il costruzionismo: quanto incidono gli schemi concettuali nella costruzione della realtà naturale e sociale? Infatti nessun realista negherebbe che l’IVA dipenda da schemi concettuali . Quello che il realista si chiede è, appunto, fin dove si spinge l’azione degli schemi concettuali, ed è qui che si manifesta il dissidio tra realisti e postmodernisti. Questi ultimi sono molto più generosi nella lista (...) delle parti di realtà che sono socialmente costruite, al punto da affermare, in taluni casi, che noi non abbiamo mai accesso a un mondo "là fuori”, ma solo con ciò che viene costruito dai nostri schemi concettuali.The actual issue at stake, in the confrontation between realists and postmodernists, is not whether you should accept or deny the existence of the external world, but the scope of constructionism: how far conceptual schemes bear on the construction of natural and social reality? Indeed, no realist would deny that the VAT depends on our conceptual schemes, which does not mean that it is purely subjective: you don’t decide whether you have to pay the VAT, it depends on where the purchase takes places. The realist just asks where the sphere of influence of conceptual schemes stops, and here the disagreement with the postmodernists begins. The latter are much more generous in listing the parts of reality that they consider socially constructed, up to maintaining that we do not have any access to the world “out there”, but only to what our conceptual schemes construct. (shrink)

Perhaps the most relevant aspect of the ongoing philosophical transformation is the splitting of binomial speculation-idealism. Indeed, one can be both realist and speculative. The paper aims to show it through a definition of negative, positive, and speculative Realism and emphasises the speculative concept of hysteresis, i.e. the survival of effects to their own causes. Indeed, it is the fundamental principle at the basis of what exists (ontology), what we do (technology), what we know (epistemology), and finally of teleology (that (...) is, of the interruption which, by putting an end to a process, simultaneously assigns a purpose to it). (shrink)

Presenting legal and philosophical essays on money, this book explores the conditions according to which an object like a piece of paper, or an electronic signal, has come to be seen as having a value. Money plays a crucial role in the regulation of social relationships and their normative determination. It is thus integral to the very nature of the "social," and the question of how society is kept together by a network of agreements, conventions, exchanges, and codes. All of (...) which must be traced down. The technologies of money discussed here by Searle, Ferraris, and Condello show how we conceive the category of the social at the intersection of individual and collective intentionality, documentality, and materiality. All of these dimensions, as the introduction to this volume demonstrates, are of vital importance for legal theory and for a whole set of legal concepts that are crucial in reflections on the relationship between law, philosophy, and society. (shrink)

Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, raises an interesting philosophical issue, namely, how can one be in touch with past things if they no longer exist? It provides us with a way to address this issue by outlining an ontological view according to which past things still exist within a four-dimensional world. Although one cannot be in touch with past things by means of ordinary perception, one can do so by combining perception and memory. In this sense, In Search (...) of Lost Time helps us to reconcile a four-dimensionalist ontology according to which things have both spatial and temporal parts with a realist phenomenology according to which experience gives us access to things as they are. In so doing, Proust’s masterpiece allows us to shed some light on what it means for a subject of experience to exist in a four-dimensional world. (shrink)

Maurizio Ferraris | : L’une des réponses au paradoxe de la fiction consiste à dire que les émotions que nous éprouvons face aux oeuvres de fiction ne sont pas véritables. Mais qu’est-ce que pleurer ou rire pour de vrai ? En fait, presque toutes les formes de rire ou de larmes, et de réactions émotionnelles, sont compatibles avec la fiction, y compris celles qui sont des émotions vraies. Ce qui pose problème dans le paradoxe est la prémisse selon laquelle nos (...) croyances au sujet de la fiction doivent être vraies ou fausses. | : One of the answers to the paradox of fiction consists in claiming that the emotions that we feel about fictions are not genuine emotions. But what is it to laugh or to cry genuinely? In fact, almost all kinds of laughter and of cry are compatible with fictions, including genuine ones. What is wrong in the paradox of fiction is the premise according to which our beliefs about fictions have to be true or false. (shrink)

Documediality indicates the allegiance between the constitutive power of documents and the mobilizing power of the media. The chapter proposes to treat documediality as the ending point of a great historical transformation whose previous phases have been capitalism and mediality. Capitalism in the strict sense corresponds to the economic era of production, and to the political era of liberalism. When populism prevails over liberalism, and communication has the upper hand over production, we enter the phase of mediality. Finally, documediality corresponds (...) to a third phase, characterized by recording: that is, by the use of a huge apparatus, namely the Web, which has the essential feature of keeping track of any interaction. This chapter highlights the key features of documediality in comparison to those of capitalism and mediality. (shrink)

The experience that we got from history of the populisms of the media, of post 9/11 wars, and of the recent economic crisis has led to a harsh denial of two central dogmas of postmodernism: the tenet that reality is socially constructed and infinitely manageable, and the tenet that truth and objectivity are useless notions. Facts, which can’t stand being reduced to interpretations, strike back for their rights. And that confirms the idea that realism has implications not only for a (...) theory of knowledge, but also for ethics and politics. (shrink)

A philosophical exchange broadly inspired by the characters of Berkeley’s Three Dialogues. Hylas is the realist philosopher: the view he stands up for reflects a robust metaphysic that is reassuringly close to common sense, grounded on the twofold persuasion that the world comes structured into entities of various kinds and at various levels and that it is the task of philosophy, if not of science generally, to “bring to light” that structure. Philonous, by contrast, is the anti-realist philosopher (though not (...) necessarily an idealist): his metaphysic is stark, arid, dishearteningly bone-dry, and stems from the conviction that a great deal of the structure that we are used to attribute to the world out there lies, on closer inspection, in our head, in our “organizing practices”, in the complex system of concepts and categories that unrerlie our representation of experience and our need to represent it that way. (shrink)

This is a sequel to our dialogue "Che cosa c'è e che cos'è (2003), focusing on the interplay between what there is and what there could be—between actuality and possibility—from the perspective of Hylas (here: the realist philosopher) and from the perspective of Philonous (here: the conventionalist anti-realist).

1 Che cose il nichilismo? Se il nichilismo è una malattia, come ripetono concordi tutti coloro che ne hanno parlato, vorrei proporne una diagnosi e una terapia. Se applicata con la dovuta attenzione, vedrete, potrete guarire in due minuti e spendendo meno di un Euro. La lunga diagnosi scritta da Nietzsche a Lenzerheide, in una stanza umida e buia che certo non avrà aiutato, insiste sul fatto che con il nichilismo vien meno la risposta alla domanda «perché», come dire «a (...) che scopo». Dal punto... (shrink)

Diego «Ma la filosofìa del linguaggio si occupa del linguaggio della filosofia?» Fu questa la domanda, che ritenevo dannatamente sagace, che rivolsi a Diego un giorno del 1975 o 1976, io matricola lui giovane professore appena tornato dall’America. «Ma naturalmente», mi rispose Diego con un sorrisetto, e continuò a camminare per il corridoio in cui, ovviamente, io avrei voluto sprofondare. Poi andò avanti così per parecchio tempo, praticamente per tutta la vita. Forse per via di quel trauma o...

This paper examines the concept of the project through a tragic but significant example, namely Albert Speer’s project. Speer, like any architect worthy of the name, does not drop his designs from some hyperuranium of creativity, nor does he confine them to a drawing board for the benefit not of the inhabitants, but of the readers; and even more, unlike a machine, he does not merely execute the prescriptions of an algorithm. It is, on the contrary, rooted in a soil. (...) By defending himself, by digging a hole of words, by invoking devices and programmes, by hiding behind a Diktat, Speer opens up a path that will be beaten after him, that, to express himself with Heidegger, of the ‘thrown project’, of the fact that all our designing is nothing but the execution of a Message from the Emperor, the submission to the injunctions of technology. But the project, if it is a project, is lagging behind the programme, and conversely a programme that is not lagging behind (the laws of nature or trains when it goes well) is not a project. The project has a constitutive delay, it always has a delay, and that is why it is the delay, it does not have a delay. (shrink)

In societies with a non-elementary degree of complexity, we find institutions, social roles, promises, marriages, corporations, enterprises, and the large variety of what we can label “social objects”. On the one hand, we commonly speak and think of such entities as if they existed on a par with entities such as tables and persons. On the other hand, there is a clear link between what people think and how people behave and the social domain. We argue that the widespread “reductionist” (...) approach in social ontology fails to account for both those aspects of social reality, and put forward a new approach. The main idea is that a particular kind of social objects, namely documents – and more generally records of social acts – are the ground of social reality. The fundamental difference from the reductionist approach is that the content of collective intentions will turn out to be not so important in accounting for the ontological variety of complex social realities such as ours. (shrink)

In this essay I try to give some overall statements in order to show that new realism is to be understood as a kind of positive philosophy. Against constructivism, I argue that there is a prevalence of the objects themselves on our understanding of them because reality offers a resistance to our attempt to grasp it depending on its level of dependence from our own understanding, which is different in the case of natural objects, ideal object and social object. This (...) negativity leads to an ontological necessity of facticity. In the second part of this paper I will describe – through the exposition of three key concepts of new realism, i.e. “unamendability”, “interaction” and “affordance” – an ascending path for which the negative and the resistance turn into positivity. (shrink)

On croit souvent que les Big data et l’univers d’internet et des réseaux sociaux constituent une forme nouvelle de pouvoir dictatorial des contrôleurs d’internet. Mais, en fait, ce à quoi nous assistons est à une nouvelle dictature du prolétariat, celle des multitudes et du populisme.

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

In ontology, realism and anti-realism may be taken as opposite attitudes towards entities of different kinds, so that one may turn out to be a realist with respect to certain entities, and an anti-realist with respect to others. In this book, the editors focus on this controversy concerning social entities in general and fictional entities in particular, the latter often being considered nowadays as kinds of social entities. More specifically, fictionalists (those who maintain that we only make-believe that there are (...) entities of a certain kind) and creationists (those who believe that entities of a certain kind are the products of human activity) present themselves as the champions of the anti-realist and the realist stance, respectively, regarding the above entities. By evaluating the pros and cons of both these positions, this book intends to focus new light on a longstanding debate. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that hermeneutics acquires additional relevance in the era of technology. In particular legal hermeneutics offers examples of how the use of specific instruments aimed at constituting legal objects (like the digital instruments used by notaries) demonstrate that legal professions will never be entirely delegated to machines. The capacity to use the instruments and the very functioning of those instruments can never be detached from comprehension, and from legal savoir.

The Dog Schema is the translation of the Italian text Lo schema del cane, originally published in Rivista di Estetica in 1998. The text presents the debate among the philosophers Umberto Eco, Maurizio Ferraris, and Diego Marconi concerning the dog schema. The debate develops through a reflection on Kantian schematism and conceptual applications, showing three different points of view on the subject.

Hamlet swears by his father that he will be revenged, and in this scene we have the characteristics of the social object oath: it is a word that is said and not simply thought of; it is a given word that cannot be withdrawn without braking the oath; it is a written word, which has a value insofar as is fixed in the memories; and it is a loyal word, since an oath presupposes faithfulness.

Laughing with the Dead «Only one boy was capable of laughing while Derossi was declaiming the funeral oration of the king, and Franti laughed.» We must be aware of this: our remembrance of Umberto Eco risks bringing back Franti, who laughed at the funeral of another Umberto, killed in Monza by Gaetano Bresci. Of course, it’s not exactly the same thing, because Franti was laughing at the dead man, or at least at the obsequies, and maybe at Derossi and his (...) way of expressing them, while we are t... (shrink)