Ratio Juris 27 (4):496-515 (2014)

Roland Pierik
University of Amsterdam
This paper reinvestigates the question of liberal neutrality. We contend that current liberal discussions have been dominated—if not hijacked—by one particular interpretation of what neutrality could imply: namely, exclusive neutrality, aiming to exclude religious and cultural expressions from the public sphere. We will argue that this is merely one among several relevant interpretations. To substantiate our claim, we will first elaborate upon inclusive neutrality by formulating two supplementary interpretations: proportional neutrality and compensatory neutrality. Second, we will argue that inclusive proportional neutrality is the most appropriate interpretation in many contexts. Our discussion highlights the fact that some political disputes should not be seen in terms of the antithesis between liberal neutrality and illiberal alternatives but, instead, as a clash between various valid but incompatible interpretations of what liberal neutrality may imply
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DOI 10.1111/raju.12057
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References found in this work BETA

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin (ed.) - 1977 - Duckworth.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.

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Citations of this work BETA

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Against Hands-on Neutrality.Bouke De Vries - 2020 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 19 (4):424-446.
Liberal Neutrality and Gender Justice.Emily McGill-Rutherford - 2017 - Social Philosophy Today 33:91-111.

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