At the center of many critiques of liberalism is liberal neutrality, which is attacked on two fronts. First, it is argued that neutrality yields a restrictive sphere of public reason. Contentious views—like those endorsed by citizens with marginalized comprehensive doctrines—are outlawed from public consideration. Second, state policies must have neutral effects, lest they differentially impact those with unpopular views. Contentious state actions—like those endorsed by citizens with marginalized moral views—are outlawed from implementation. It is this combination of demands for neutrality (...) at the individual and state levels that produces the concern: if marginalized comprehensive doctrines cannot be discussed in the realm of public reason, and if marginalized moral views cannot be acted upon by the state, how will we ever achieve the goals of feminism, itself a marginalized moral view? Does liberal neutrality prohibit progress toward gender equality? In this paper, I argue to the contrary. Many objections regarding liberalism’s supposed failure to secure gender justice rely on a conception of neutrality as neutrality of effect. But at both the individual and state levels, liberalism’s demand for neutrality is about justification. Liberalism, specifically political liberalism, requires neither neutral content of public reasons nor neutral effects of state policies. (shrink)

In this article, we scrutinize several arguments that are frequently used to legitimize a ban on religious symbols for civil servants. Most arguments, however, do not stand up to the test of Rawlsian political liberalism. One argument stands out as underpinning such a general ban: state neutrality. While this argument has the most potential, we argue why it is still not decisive for a ban on all religious symbols for all civil servants. We conclude that from a political liberal point (...) of view the discussion is inconclusive, and therefore advocate a context-sensitive and balanced approach to the matter of civil servants’ dress code with respect to religious symbols. By arguing that political liberalism is indecisive, our position is different from both ‘exclusive neutrality’ and ‘inclusive neutrality’. (shrink)

The central notion in this article is ‘pluriform accommodation,’ a term that we have coined to defend two lines of thought. The first is a plea for inclusive and consequential neutrality; the second is a closely linked plea for reasonable accommodation. With ‘pluriform accommodation’ we emphasize that the multicultural recognition scope should be expanded. The need for inclusive and accommodative rules, laws, and practices is a matter of principle and as such cannot be reduced to the inclusion of people with (...) an immigration background who bring with them all kinds of ethnocultural and religious practices, convictions, and traditions. Furthermore, the enshrined freedom of religion does not provide the needed protection for the multiplicity of conscientious identifications, convictions, and strong allegiances that might be central to one’s sense of self. We argue that we should not engage in (top down) debates about the rights of individuals and groups of different types and think in terms of identity hierarchies, but instead should consider the various claims being made (bottom up), aiming for common standards and criteria to assess the validity of these claims and the reasonableness of the associated accommodations. (shrink)

The central notion in this article is ‘pluriform accommodation,’ a term that we have coined to defend two lines of thought. The first is a plea for inclusive and consequential neutrality; the second is a closely linked plea for reasonable accommodation. With ‘pluriform accommodation’ we emphasize that the multicultural recognition scope should be expanded. The need for inclusive and accommodative rules, laws, and practices is a matter of principle and as such cannot be reduced to the inclusion of people with (...) an immigration background who bring with them all kinds of ethnocultural and religious practices, convictions, and traditions. Furthermore, the enshrined freedom of religion does not provide the needed protection for the multiplicity of conscientious identifications, convictions, and strong allegiances that might be central to one’s sense of self. We argue that we should not engage in (top down) debates about the rights of individuals and groups of different types and think in terms of identity hierarchies, but instead should consider the various claims being made (bottom up), aiming for common standards and criteria to assess the validity of these claims and the reasonableness of the associated accommodations. (shrink)

Many existing defenses of group rights seem to rely on the notion of group freedom. To date, however, no adequate analysis of this notion has been offered. Group freedom is best understood in terms of processes of social categorization that are embedded in social mechanisms. Such processes often give rise to group-specific constraints and enablements. On the proposed social mechanism account, group rights are demands for group freedom. Even so, group rights often serve to eradicate individual unfreedom. Furthermore, generic measures (...) sometimes provide the most appropriate solution to a problem of group unfreedom. (shrink)

One element of the liberal ideal of secularity is the principle that the state should treat religions neutrally: This is the religious neutrality requirement. Applied to religious belief systems, the principle stipulates that the state should not take a position on whether or not a certain religion is true. I challenge this ideal and argue that teachers in public schools sometimes need to take a position on religious truth claims in order to avoid the risk of promoting false beliefs. I (...) then argue that not acting to avert these implications is sufficiently costly to justify the abandonment of this requirement. (shrink)

Many political theorists are multiculturalists. They believe that states ought to support and accommodate minority cultures, even if they disagree about when such support and accommodations are due and what forms they should take. In this contribution, I argue that multiculturalists have failed to notice an important objection against a wide range of multiculturalism policies. This objection is predicated on the notion that when states support and accommodate minority cultures, they should support and accommodate many subcultures and individualistic conceptions of (...) the good as well. However, since a significant proportion of multiculturalism policies imposes financial costs on society, it will often be prohibitively expensive for states to support and accommodate citizens’ subcultures and individualistic conceptions of the good on an equal basis. The result is that implementing such policies is likely to end up discriminating against certain groups, which might include e.g. fervent football fans, globe-trotters, mountain climbers, motor bikers, Hippies, and artists. I conclude by considering six reasons for giving preferential treatment to minority cultures that would allow multiculturalists to avoid this implication, which invoke, inter alia, the depth, duration, and involuntariness of cultural commitments; the role of culture in allowing people to live autonomously; and cultural rights to political self-determination. None are found to be convincing. (shrink)

In recent years, several theorists have defended a form of neutrality that seeks to equalise the benefits that state policies bestow upon citizens’ conceptions of the good life. For example, when state policies confer special benefits upon a conception that revolves around a particular culture, religion or type of sports, other cultures, religions or types of sports might be due compensation. This article argues that this kind of neutrality – which I refer to as ‘hands-on neutrality’ – cannot be vindicated, (...) whether it takes a resourcist form or welfarist form. After explaining why states cannot simply avoid bestowing unequal advantages upon citizens’ conceptions of the good life, I identify several versions of hands-on neutrality and show that all of them fail to respect the moral equality of citizens. (In so doing, however, I do find that a different form of neutrality is appropriately applied under a more limited set of conditions, which is lottery-based.) I conclude by showing that in cases where theories of hands-on neutrality have intuitive force, more plausible rival principles can account for our intuitions. (shrink)