Counterfactual fairness: The case study of a food delivery platform’s reputational-ranking algorithm

Frontiers in Psychology 13 (2022)
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Abstract

Data-driven algorithms are currently deployed in several fields, leading to a rapid increase in the importance algorithms have in decision-making processes. Over the last years, several instances of discrimination by algorithms were observed. A new branch of research emerged to examine the concept of “algorithmic fairness.” No consensus currently exists on a single operationalization of fairness, although causal-based definitions are arguably more aligned with the human conception of fairness. The aim of this article is to investigate the degree of this alignment in a case study inspired by a recent ruling of an Italian court on the reputational-ranking algorithm used by a food delivery platform. I relied on the documentation of the legal dispute to discuss the applicability, intuitiveness and appropriateness of causal models in evaluating fairness, with a specific focus on a causal-based fairness definition called “counterfactual fairness.” I first describe the details of the dispute and the arguments presented to the court, as well as the court’s final decision, to establish the context of the case study. Then, I translate the dispute into a formal simplified problem using a causal diagram, which represents the main aspects of the data generation process in the case study. I identify the criteria used by the court in ruling that the algorithm was unfair and compare them with the counterfactual fairness definition. The definition of counterfactual fairness was found to be well aligned with the human conception of fairness in this case study, using the court order rationale as a gold standard.

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