Dr. Quine's theory of truth-functions

Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):64-67 (1942)
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Abstract

This comment piece examines the distinction between negation of a statement and denial of its truth, in the context of an early examination of Quine's related views. Where P is "Jones is ill," the author maintains, in contrast to Quine, that the negation of P is "Jones is ill" is false.

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