Free persons and freee choices

History of Political Thought 28 (4):709-718 (2007)
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Abstract

Social freedom may be taken to be primarily a property of persons, derivatively a property of choices, or the other way round. Nowadays it is standard to take it the other way round. But there is much to be said for the person-based rather than the choice- based way of thinking. And this way of thinking is characteristic of the neo-Roman, republican tradition

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Philip Pettit
Australian National University

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Freedom and Viruses.Kieran Oberman - 2022 - Ethics 132 (4):817-850.
Republicanism and Structural Domination.Rafeeq Hasan - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (2):292-319.
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Slaves, Prisoners, and Republican Freedom.Fabian Wendt - 2011 - Res Publica 17 (2):175-192.

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