In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell (2013)

Wlodek Rabinowicz
Lund University
According to an influential tradition in value analysis, to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude – a fitting object of favoring. If it is fitting to favor an object for its own sake, then, in this view, the object has final value. If it is fitting to favor an object for the sake of its effects, then its value is instrumental. Disvalue is connected in the analogous way to disfavoring, i.e., to con-attitudes. For a history of this fitting-attitudes analysis, or FA-analysis for short, see the following text. The label itself was coined rather recently, though, in Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen.
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References found in this work BETA

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Value in Ethics and Economics.Elizabeth Anderson - 1993 - Harvard University Press.
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. London: Routledge. pp. 110-129.

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Citations of this work BETA

Value Relations Revisited.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2012 - Economics and Philosophy 28 (2):133-164.
Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Partiality, Preferences and Perspective.Graham Oddie - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):57-81.
Fitting-Attitude Analyses and the Relation Between Final and Intrinsic Value.Antoine C. Dussault - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):166-189.

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