Emotions, intentionality, and practical rationality the contrast between the theories of emotions of William James and Antonio Damasio

Ideas Y Valores 68 (170):13-36 (2019)
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Abstract

RESUMEN Se presentan y discuten las teorías de las emociones de W. James y de A. Damasio, enfatizando en la intencionalidad de las emociones y en su vínculo con la racionalidad práctica. Se argumenta que la propuesta de James enfrenta varias dificultades para dar cuenta de ambos aspectos de las emociones, y se muestra cómo la teoría neo-jamesiana de Damasio supera en parte algunas de esas dificultades, pero también da pie a otras objeciones. Se resume la propuesta de Jesse Prinz sobre las emociones como "evaluaciones corporalizadas", que busca incluir el aspecto cognitivo y la naturaleza corporal de las emociones. ABSTRACT The article presents and discusses the theories of emotions of W. James and A. Damasio, with emphasis on the intentionality of emotions and their connection with practical rationality. It argues that James' proposal encounters several difficulties in accounting for both aspects of emotions, and shows how Damasio's neo-Jamesian theory partly overcomes some of those difficulties, while giving rise to other objections. Finally, it summarizes Jesse Prinz's proposal regarding emotions as "embodied appraisals", which seeks to combine the cognitive aspect and the corporeal nature of emotions.

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