Alternative possibilities and causal histories

Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):119-138 (2000)
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10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.7

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Derk Pereboom
Cornell University

Citations of this work

Moral Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Uncompromising source incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.
Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.

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References found in this work

Recent work on moral responsibility.John Fischer - 1999 - Ethics 110 (1):93–139.
Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.

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