Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118 (2009)

Derk Pereboom
Cornell University
I have presented a Frankfurt-style argument (Pereboom 2000, 2001, 2003) against the requirement of robust alternative possibilities for moral responsibility that features an example, Tax Evasion , in which an agent is intuitively morally responsible for a decision, has no robust alternative possibilities, and is clearly not causally determined to make the decision. Here I revise the criterion for robustness in response to suggestions by Dana Nelkin, Jonathan Vance, and Kevin Timpe, and I respond to objections to the argument by Carlos Moya and David Widerker, in the process of which I refine the Tax Evasion example
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DOI 10.1080/13869790902838795
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References found in this work BETA

Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):494-497.

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The Limits of Limited-Blockage Frankfurt-Style Cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.

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