Abstract

This thesis aims to study the origins of interiority from an externalist perspective. The process by which self-knowledge is formed is considered in relation to the development of the first-person perspective. From a first-person perspective, one is capable of self-referring and knowing one's own mental and physical states. Self-consciousness and self-knowledge are discussed in relation to Descartes' idea of first-person authority. The Cartesian idea contends that the first-person perspective has privileged and non-empirical access to one's own mental state. On the contrary, externalism's central thesis contends that the content of one's own mental state originates from interactions with the environment, thus, there is no privileged access of one's own mental state. Thus, the externalist's thesis puts into question the Cartesian idea of privileged epistemic access of the first person. The perceptual externalism of Davidson, for example, proposes a triadic solution to the origins of self-knowledge. Davidson's thesis is presented as reconciling self-knowledge and the basic externalist ideas. Two externalist models on the origins of self-knowledge are further discussed: 1) ecological models proposing a development of a sense of self as a function of interactions with the environment; 2) the psychological model of Winnicott proposing that the developing sense of self arises from the triadic relation between self, others, and transitional object(s). We defend the thesis that Winnicott's model is the most apt at describing the Davidsonian externalist model of the origins of self-knowledge.