Hedonic value of intentional action provides reinforcement for voluntary generation but not voluntary inhibition of action

Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1253-1261 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Intentional inhibition refers to stopping oneself from performing an action at the last moment, a vital component of self-control. It has been suggested that intentional inhibition is associated with negative hedonic value, perhaps due to the frustration of cancelling an intended action. Here we investigate hedonic implications of the free choice to act or inhibit. Participants gave aesthetic ratings of arbitrary visual stimuli that immediately followed voluntary decisions to act or to inhibit action. We found that participants for whom decisions to act produced a strong positive hedonic value for the immediately following visual stimulus made more choices to act than those with weaker hedonic value for action. This finding is consistent with reinforcement learning of action decisions. However, participants who experienced inhibition as generating more positive hedonic value did not choose to inhibit more than other participants. Thus, voluntary inhibition of action did not act as reinforcement for future inhibitory behaviour. Our finding that inhibition of action lacks motivational capacity may explain why self-control is both difficult and limited

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,672

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Judging as a non-voluntary action.Conor McHugh - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.
Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
How we act: causes, reasons, and intentions.Berent Enç - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Acquisition and control of voluntary action.Bernhard Hommel - 2003 - In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary action: brains, minds, and sociality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 34--48.
Libertad y revocabilidad.Chirstopher Martin - 1994 - Anuario Filosófico 27 (3):991-1006.
Free will and voluntary action.John Ladd - 1951 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (March):392-405.
Four Teleological Orders of Human Action.Quentin Smith - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (3):213-230.
Consciousness in act and action.Keith Hossack - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):187-203.
Intentional action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
The interaction of cortex and basal ganglia in the control of voluntary actions.G. Roth - 2003 - In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary action: brains, minds, and sociality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 115--132.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-15

Downloads
33 (#481,697)

6 months
6 (#507,808)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?