Consciousness in act and action

Abstract

This paper develops an account of consciousness in action. Both consciousness and action are related to knowledge. A voluntary action is defined as a volition, or something intentionally effected by means of such volitions. Volitions are conscious mental acts whose proper function is to make their content true. A mental act is the exercise of a power of mind and a conscious mental act is identical with knowledge of its own phenomenal character. This set of definitions elucidates the relations between consciousness, action and knowledge

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Author's Profile

Keith Hossack
Birkbeck College

References found in this work

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Facts and Propositions.Frank P. Ramsey - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-170.

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Citations of this work

The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.
Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.
An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness.Alan Thomas - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):161-85.

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