Abstract

Bradley’s philosophy of history, which was mostly embodied in his first published work, The Presuppositions of Critical History, has been the subject of a number of explanatory and critical pieces, several of them in the pages of this journal. In outlining the fundamentals of his approach to historical knowledge, therefore, I can be brief. He begins, ‘There is no history which in some respects is not more or less critical’, because selection of information is essential and the historian needs some principle of selection. It is clear that Bradley includes selecting information not just from primary sources but from previous historians. And, ‘if we exclude or alter or rationalise to the very smallest extent then we have criticism at once.’ The criterion, or canon of selection has to be the historian himself. This has sometimes been dismissed as dangerously relativist, but such criticism misses the point that although the actual historian is the real criterion, ‘the historian as he ought to be’ is the ideal criterion; and ‘the historian who is true to the present is the historian as he ought to be.’ It is crucial to Bradley’s position and to the development of my argument in this paper to note that it is the historian who is true to the present, not to the past, who is the historian as he ought to be. For, as Bradley explained, ‘every man’s present standpoint ought to determine his belief in respect to all past events; but to no man do I dictate what his present standpoint ought to be. Consistency is the one word that I have emphasised.’ Bradley denied a correspondence theory of truth in favour of a coherence theory. Truth had to be constructed by the knower who was not a mere passive observer of reality..