Empirical Realism Without Transcendental Idealism. Comment on Kenneth R. Westphal

Esercizi Filosofici 10 (1) (2015)
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Abstract

In dialogue with Kenneth R. Westphal’s position on realism and skepticism I defend an empirical realism which in a positive perspective rejects the transcendental components of Kant’s empirical realism. The central ideas of the empirical realism I support are the characterizations of reality and truth as regulative ideals and of knowledge as unifying activity. I justify my conception by a conceptual and pragmatic analysis of the main relevant epistemological notions.

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