Abstract

We focus on Dworkin’s ethical individualism because it is the basic substrate of his moral and political philosophy. Ethical individualism consists of two main principles; that of equal concern and respect, and the special responsibility thesis. We consider that both principles hold certain metaphysical origins. The principle of equal concern retains a connection with the notion of natural equality. This point is elegantly expressed in an earlier paper of Dworkin, who comments on Rawls’ original position. In that paper, Rawls’ veil of ignorance is substituted by Dworkin’s deep theory. Ronald Dworkin unsuccessfully tries to persuade that this deep theory is metaphysically neutral. Moreover, the principles of ethical individualism are not neutral in a metaethical sense. Dworkin calls upon a general agreement on his principles. According to “Objectivity and Truth” the two principles are I-moral propositions. Their weight rests on their form as “rational intuitions”. Dworkin’s metaethics stem from Moore’s intuitionism and this is clear in “Objectivity and Truth” where he defends an “extended” non-naturalistic moral realism. The problem is that this extended realism includes a priori truths which belong to some form of idealism. Dworkin replaces the Archimedean platform with an Euclidean one, but he does not explicitly state it because of his fear of Platonism.