Studia Logica 103 (3):579-598 (2015)

Federico Pailos
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
Theories where truth is a naive concept fall under the following dilemma: either the theory is subject to Curry’s Paradox, which engenders triviality, or the theory is not trivial but the resulting conditional is too weak. In this paper we explore a number of theories which arguably do not fall under this dilemma. In these theories the conditional is characterized in terms of non-deterministic matrices. These non-deterministic theories are similar to infinitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic in that they are consistent and their conditionals are quite strong. The difference is the following: while Łukasiewicz logic is \-inconsistent, the non-deterministic theories might turn out to be \-consistent
Keywords Naive truth theory  Łukasiewicz logic  Curry’s paradox  Non-deterministic semantics   $${\omega}$$ ω -Inconsistency
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DOI 10.1007/s11225-014-9580-1
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References found in this work BETA

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Spandrels of Truth.J. C. Beall - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is.Graham Priest - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):544-545.
Spandrels of Truth.Jc Beall - 2010 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):284-286.

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A 4-Valued Logic of Strong Conditional.Fabien Schang - 2018 - South American Journal of Logic 3 (1):59-86.

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