Abstract
Lehrer's example is not counter to the analysis I set forth. I grant it to be not the case that Makesure is now completely justified in believing that Deadly is a murderer. But why are we to say so? We are told it is because "he has been confused by a lie." It is not because Makesure possesses new information which undermines the evidence he originally had. It is known that the testimony of the friend was a lie. If Lehrer's example defeats my analysis, so would a much simpler one. Suppose that Makesure has not spoken with his friend but has died. In a manner similar to Lehrer's, we should say it is not the case that Makesure is now completely justified in believing that Deadly is guilty. Being dead, he can't believe a thing. Are we to conclude on the basis of my analysis, then, that we cannot say with warrant that Makesure knew, originally, that Deadly was a murderer? No, for immediately following the formulation of my analysis which Lehrer cites, I had said, "Spelled out more carefully, would read 'X would be completely justified now, simply on the basis of the evidence he had then, in believing that p or in claiming to know that p'." Makesure's present confusion, or death, is irrelevant to the satisfaction of this condition. In the example we say that Makesure knew because we realize that were he neither confused nor dead, then he would now be completely justified in his belief. Notice that at the time of the friend's testimony we could not have said then that was satisfied. We say so later only after the lying nature of the testimony has come to light. To repeat, we now say that Makesure knew that Deadly was the murderer because we now realize that Makesure's original evidence was perfectly adequate. Far from being a defeating instance, it seems to me that the example is readily handled by the analysis I have proposed.