Abstract
In this paper we draw on the munāẓara tradition to intervene in the debate on whether argument assessment should be agent- or act-based. We introduce and deploy the notion of _sequencing_ – the ordering of the antagonist’s critical moves – to make explicit an ambiguity between the _agent_ and the _act_ of arguing. We show that sequencing is a component of argumentation that inextricably involves the procedure as well as the agent and, therefore, its assessment cannot be adequately undertaken if either agent- or act-based norms are ignored or demoted. We present our intervention through a challenge that virtue argumentation needs to address for it to be considered an alternative to existing theories of argument assessment (Section 2 ). We then briefly introduce munāẓara and focus on its notion of sequencing to explicate the interdependence between the agent and the procedure (Section 3 ). Next, we address the challenge by offering an account of the virtuous arguer as a virtuous sequencer (Section 4 ). In conclusion, we reflect on the implications of sequencing on virtue argumentation and the norms of argumentation.