Abstract

Some moral philosophers call for the dismissal of famous moral theories such as consequentialism and Kanfianism, charging that they are too demanding. In response, moderates argue that these theories are worth retaining, but only if they are made less demanding. I take the moderate view in this dissertation. Focusing on consequentialism, I argue that the moderate stance is wider and therefore stronger than it is generally portrayed to be. In addition to the well-known and extreme position of famous consequentialist moderate Samuel Scheffler, there exist less extreme positions sketched here and there in the philosophical literature. These less extreme positions make only minor alterations to consequentialisin in their efforts to make it less demanding. Hence they avoid the attack of 'extremist' Shelly Kagan, who argues that the moderate is on unstable theoretical footing and must accept moral theory, demandingness and all. I conclude that a view of moderacy that embraces less extreme positions along with more extreme positions is better equipped to salvage overly-demanding moral theories such as consequentialism