Abstract

The critical studies on Dostoevsky’s ‘The Dream of a Ridiculous Man’ have never diverged to a very great extent from the two interpretative lines developed many years ago by Mikhail Bakhtin and Nikolai Berdyaev, which concern, on the one hand, the Menippean satirical structure of this short story and, on the other, its general motif of ‘utopia vs. anti-utopia.’ Although these two views are unquestionably enlightening, mainly because they reflect Dostoevsky’s poetics from the 1870s, they still do not seem to have fully considered the central problem the ridiculous man raises throughout his monologue. This problem concerns the main character’s fundamental quest for truth. This article offers a reading of Dostoevsky’s story, with a new interpretation of it that does not exclude but, in fact, extends Bakhtin’s and Berdyaev’s views. While the purpose of the Menippean satire is, as Bakhtin suggested, to test an idea, in ‘The Dream of a Ridiculous Man’ Dostoevsky examines three different ideas of ‘truth’ each of which correspond to the protagonist’s various stages of awareness that occur in the three main parts of the narrative: before, during, and after the dream. These ideas are: a nihilistic solipsism of a higher consciousness; the natural perfection of a pantheistic universe; and the primacy of life over thought. The result of this analysis leads to the philosophical problem of ‘difference,’ understood as a ‘transcendent difference’ à la Fichte, which offers a new insight into Dostoevsky’s ‘higher realism.’