Synthese 197 (5):2039-2050 (2020)

James Openshaw
Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes
This paper defends Lewis’ influential treatment of de se attitudes from recent criticism to the effect that a key explanatory notion—self-ascription—goes unexplained. It is shown that Lewis’ treatment can be reconstructed in a way which provides clear responses. This sheds light on the explanatory ambitions of those engaged in Lewis’ project.
Keywords De se  Self-ascription  David Lewis  Centered worlds  Properties
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1781-0
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.

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Citations of this work BETA

Private Investigators and Public Speakers.Alexander Sandgren - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.

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