Animal Minds in Medieval Latin Philosophy: A Sourcebook From Augustine to Wodeham

Springer Verlag (2021)
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Abstract

This sourcebook explores how the Middle Ages dealt with questions related to the mental life of creatures great and small. It makes accessible a wide range of key Latin texts from the fourth to the fourteenth century in fresh English translations. Specialists and non-specialists alike will find many surprising insights in this comprehensive collection of sources on the medieval philosophy of animal minds. The book’s structure follows the distinction between the different aspects of the mental. The author has organized the material in three main parts: cognition, emotions, and volition. Each part contains translations of texts by different medieval thinkers. The philosophers chosen include well-known figures like Augustine, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas. The collection also profiles the work of less studied thinkers like John Blund, Peter of Spain, and Peter of Abano. In addition, among those featured are several translated here into English for the first time. Each text comes with a short introduction to the philosopher, the context, and the main arguments of the text plus a section with bibliographical information and recommendations for further reading. A general introduction to the entire volume presents the basic concepts and questions of the philosophy of animal minds and explains how the medieval discussion relates to the contemporary debate. This sourcebook is valuable for anyone interested in the history of philosophy, especially medieval philosophy of mind. It will also appeal to scholars and students from other fields, such as psychology, theology, and cultural studies.

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9783030670115   9783030670122   3030670112   3030670147

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10.1007/978-3-030-67012-2
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Chapters

Introduction: Modern and Medieval Philosophy of Animal Minds

How do animals see the world? Do they have feelings? Can they willingly control their behaviours? Such questions are asked and answered in contemporary philosophy of animal minds. If one looks at the history of this discipline there seems to exist no medieval precursor because a mind or the rational... see more

Intellect, Reason, and Immortality

This dialogue discusses a number of examples which seem to show that in various situations also nonhuman animals behave quite rationally. Although many of these examples are anecdotes of animal behaviour taken from the theological and philosophical literature of the time, Ralph of Battle uses them t... see more

Erring

In his commentary on the Sentences, Adam Wodeham tries to account for sensory illusions. In his view, they result from erroneous judgments. However, he has to address the question of how nonhuman animals can also fall prey to such an illusion. Because if illusions are erroneous judgments and if anim... see more

Inner Senses

Question 78 of the first part of Aquinas’ famous Summa theologiae concerns human psychology, in particular the ‘powers’ or faculties of the human soul. In article 4, Aquinas wonders whether the sensory part of the human soul has been properly divided into a certain number of external senses, such as... see more

Foresight and Deliberation

According to Aristotle, nonhuman animals lack the faculties of intellect and reason. Therefore, it seems that one cannot account for their behaviour by rational causes. However, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Bacon spends several pages discussing the question of why nonhuman animal behavi... see more

Modes of Estimation

Avicenna’s book on the soul decisively shaped Latin thinkers’ views of animal minds. One of its most influential elements was the theory of the internal senses, particularly, of the faculty of estimation. Many interpreters used, and still use, to call the reaction triggered by estimation an instinct... see more

The Animal Soul and Its Powers

Once Avicenna’s psychological works had been translated into Latin during the second half of the twelfth century, Latin thinkers’ accounts of animal cognition significantly changed. This change mainly revolved around the so-called theory of internal senses. It postulates that, in addition to the fiv... see more

Judging

In a passage of his commentary on the Sentences, Gregory of Rimini tries to define different forms of knowledge and discusses the differences between human and nonhuman knowledge. Most of his answer to the question of whether nonhuman animals have what he calls ‘complex knowledge’ is a critique of W... see more

Estimation and Concept Formation

John Blund, born in England around 1175, is one of the first Latin thinkers to discuss Avicenna’s theory of estimation. But even though he adopts this theory he notes that it gives rise to various problems and questions. He wonders, for example, whether intentions are universals, that is, general co... see more

Universal Cognition

The commentary on Aristotle’s zoological works by Pseudo-Peter of Spain is one of the few texts in which a late-medieval author develops an innovative account of universal cognition. This capacity was usually taken to be a prerogative of the intellect of humans, angels, and God. However, according t... see more

Prudence

Like Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus was a highly important and influential thinker in the later Middle Ages. Yet, unlike Albert and Aquinas, he was a Franciscan friar. Unfortunately, we are in the dark regarding most details of his biography. Although the last part of his name... see more

Learning, Language, and Reasoning

In his commentary on Aristotle’s zoological works, Albert the Great notes that there are different degrees of learning. Although many nonhuman animals can be trained to follow the commands of their masters, only humans seem to be capable of learning to the extent that they engage in arts and science... see more

Reasoning and Thinking

In a passage of his treatise on optics, Roger Bacon discusses the so-called power of cogitation . Contrary to other medieval thinkers, he ascribes this faculty to both humans and nonhuman animals. This is noteworthy insofar as it was usually taken to be a rational faculty. Bacon, however, claims tha... see more

Perception, Knowledge, Reason, and Mind

In On the Magnitude of the Soul, written around AD 388, Augustine and his interlocutor Evodius discuss the nature of the soul. At a certain point they try to come up with a definition of sensory perception . However, they realise that in order to arrive at a consistent definition a number of qualifi... see more

Memory, Learning, and Prudence

Aristotle’s Metaphysics gave rise to various discussions of animal cognition in the later Middle Ages, because it starts with a distinction between different kinds of animals based on their cognitive capacities. While all animals can engage in sensory perception , not all of them have memory , and e... see more

Free Choice, Free Judgment, and Free Appetite

In his comprehensive treatise On Human Beings, Albert the Great discusses a large number of questions centring on the nature of humans. A fundamental question in this context is in what sense humans are unique. Therefore, Albert also raises various questions concerning the features and capacities of... see more

Choosing and Acting

In question 13, article 2, of part I–II of the Summatheologiae, Thomas Aquinas addresses the question of whether nonhuman animals are capable of making a ‘choice’ . Since he adopts Aristotle’s definition of choice as the capacity to find the right means to an end, it seems, at first, as if various c... see more

Free Choice

In his commentary on the second book of the Sentences, Bonaventure discusses the nature of various creatures, including nonhuman animals. He provides an insightful approach to the question of whether or not ‘free choice’, ‘decision’ or ‘judgment’ – which he defines with Augustine as joint “faculty o... see more

Instinct and Deliberation

In a passage of his Communianaturalium, Bacon distinguishes two types of agents: those who act intentionally, that is, by deliberation and will, and those who act naturally, that is, by instinct. One might assume that humans clearly fall within the first category, whereas nonhuman animals belong to ... see more

Freedom and Free Choice

In his Disputed Questions on Truth, Thomas Aquinas discusses the question of whether nonhuman animals are endowed with free choice . The treatise consists of two major sets of questions. The second one is concerned with the good, that is, with one of the ends, if not the end, of human actions. But w... see more

Appetites and Emotions

In Thomas Aquinas’ theory of emotions, emotions are embedded in a larger psychological framework. They are features of so-called appetitive powers. Contrary to apprehensive powers, which make a being cognitively apprehend something, appetitive powers make a being strive for something. They are furth... see more

Pleasure

In his commentary on the Problemata , Peter of Abano addresses the question of why the term ‘incontinence’ is employed for pleasures deriving from touch and taste, but not from smelling, sight, and hearing. One suggestion is that, since touch and taste are shared by humans and almost all nonhuman an... see more

Friendship, Enmity, and Fear

In his question commentary on Aristotle’s writings on animals, Albert the Great also raises some questions regarding the emotional life of animals. Although friendship and enmity, which are the topics of questions 1 and 2 of book 8, do not strictly speaking qualify as emotions, it is clear that they... see more

Hope and Despair

In Summa theologiae I-II.40.3, Thomas Aquinas discusses whether nonhuman animals possess the emotion of hope and despair . According to his division of emotions, humans have hope when they try to attain a good that is absent but attainable. Despair, by contrast, is felt when one longs for something ... see more

Enjoyment

In his Summa theologiae, Thomas Aquinas also raises fundamental psychological questions that go beyond the field of theology. One of these questions concerns the character of enjoyment and its possible existence in nonhuman animals. From a folk psychological point of view, it seems obvious that not ... see more

Intellect, Reason, and Immortality (Ralph of Battle, De nesciente et sciente, Book I, Chapter 4)

This dialogue discusses a number of examples which seem to show that in various situations also nonhuman animals behave quite rationally. Although many of these examples are anecdotes of animal behaviour taken from the theological and philosophical literature of the time, Ralph of Battle uses them t... see more

Erring (Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, Prologue, Question 4, §8)

In his commentary on the Sentences, Adam Wodeham tries to account for sensory illusions. In his view, they result from erroneous judgments. However, he has to address the question of how nonhuman animals can also fall prey to such an illusion. Because if illusions are erroneous judgments and if anim... see more

Inner Senses (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Part I, Question 78, Article 4)

Question 78 of the first part of Aquinas’ famous Summa theologiae concerns human psychology, in particular the ‘powers’ (potentiae) or faculties of the human soul. In article 4, Aquinas wonders whether the sensory part of the human soul has been properly divided into a certain number of external sen... see more

Foresight and Deliberation (Roger Bacon, Questiones super libros quatuor Physicorum, Book II)

According to Aristotle, nonhuman animals lack the faculties of intellect and reason. Therefore, it seems that one cannot account for their behaviour by rational causes. However, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Bacon spends several pages discussing the question of why nonhuman animal behavi... see more

Modes of Estimation (Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima, Book IV, Chapter 3)

Avicenna’s book on the soul decisively shaped Latin thinkers’ views of animal minds. One of its most influential elements was the theory of the internal senses, particularly, of the faculty of estimation. Many interpreters used, and still use, to call the reaction triggered by estimation an instinct... see more

The Animal Soul and Its Powers (Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima, Book I, Chapter 5)

Once Avicenna’s psychological works had been translated into Latin during the second half of the twelfth century, Latin thinkers’ accounts of animal cognition significantly changed. This change mainly revolved around the so-called theory of internal senses. It postulates that, in addition to the fiv... see more

Judging (Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum Sententiarum, Distinction 3, Question 1, Article 1)

In a passage of his commentary on the Sentences, Gregory of Rimini tries to define different forms of knowledge (notitia) and discusses the differences between human and nonhuman knowledge. Most of his answer to the question of whether nonhuman animals have what he calls ‘complex knowledge’ (notitia... see more

Estimation and Concept Formation (John Blund, Tractatus de anima, Chapter 19)

John Blund, born in England around 1175, is one of the first Latin thinkers to discuss Avicenna’s theory of estimation. But even though he adopts this theory he notes that it gives rise to various problems and questions. He wonders, for example, whether intentions are universals, that is, general co... see more

Universal Cognition (Pseudo-Peterof Spain, Commentum super libros De animalibus VIII)

The commentary on Aristotle’s zoological works by Pseudo-Peter of Spain is one of the few texts in which a late-medieval author develops an innovative account of universal cognition. This capacity was usually taken to be a prerogative of the intellect of humans, angels, and God. However, according t... see more

Prudence (John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Book I, Question 3)

Like Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus was a highly important and influential thinker in the later Middle Ages. Yet, unlike Albert and Aquinas, he was a Franciscan friar. Unfortunately, we are in the dark regarding most details of his biography. Although the last part of his name... see more

Learning, Language, and Reasoning(Albert the Great, De animalibus, Book 21, Treatise 1, Chapters 2–4)

In his commentary on Aristotle’s zoological works, Albert the Great notes that there are different degrees of learning. Although many nonhuman animals can be trained to follow the commands of their masters, only humans seem to be capable of learning to the extent that they engage in arts and science... see more

Reasoning and Thinking (Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, Part II, Distinction 3, Chapter 9)

In a passage of his treatise on optics, Roger Bacon discusses the so-called power of cogitation (virtus cogitativa). Contrary to other medieval thinkers, he ascribes this faculty to both humans and nonhuman animals. This is noteworthy insofar as it was usually taken to be a rational faculty. Bacon, ... see more

Perception, Knowledge, Reason, and Mind (Augustine, De quantitate animae, Chapters 25–28)

In On the Magnitude of the Soul, written around AD 388, Augustine and his interlocutor Evodius discuss the nature of the soul. At a certain point they try to come up with a definition of sensory perception (sensus). However, they realise that in order to arrive at a consistent definition a number of... see more

Memory, Learning, and Prudence (Albert the Great, Metaphysica, Book I, Treatise 1, Chapter 6)

Aristotle’s Metaphysics gave rise to various discussions of animal cognition in the later Middle Ages, because it starts with a distinction between different kinds of animals based on their cognitive capacities. While all animals can engage in sensory perception (sensus), not all of them have memory... see more

Free Choice, Free Judgment, and Free Appetite (Albert the Great, De homine I)

In his comprehensive treatise On Human Beings, Albert the Great discusses a large number of questions centring on the nature of humans. A fundamental question in this context is in what sense humans are unique. Therefore, Albert also raises various questions concerning the features and capacities of... see more

Choosing and Acting (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Part I–II, Question 13, Article 2)

In question 13, article 2, of part I–II of the Summatheologiae, Thomas Aquinas addresses the question of whether nonhuman animals are capable of making a ‘choice’ (electio). Since he adopts Aristotle’s definition of choice as the capacity to find the right means to an end, it seems, at first, as if ... see more

Free Choice (Bonaventure, Commentarius in secundum librum Sententiarum, Distinction 25, Single Article, Question 1)

In his commentary on the second book of the Sentences, Bonaventure discusses the nature of various creatures, including nonhuman animals. He provides an insightful approach to the question of whether or not ‘free choice’, ‘decision’ or ‘judgment’ (liberum arbitrium) – which he defines with Augustine... see more

Instinct and Deliberation (Roger Bacon, Communia naturalium Book 1, Part 2, Distinction 4, Chapter 1)

In a passage of his Communianaturalium, Bacon distinguishes two types of agents: those who act intentionally, that is, by deliberation and will, and those who act naturally, that is, by instinct. One might assume that humans clearly fall within the first category, whereas nonhuman animals belong to ... see more

Freedom and Free Choice (Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, Question 24, Article 2)

In his Disputed Questions on Truth, Thomas Aquinas discusses the question of whether nonhuman animals are endowed with free choice (liberum arbitrium). The treatise consists of two major sets of questions. The second one is concerned with the good, that is, with one of the ends, if not the end, of h... see more

Appetites and Emotions (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Part I, Question 81, Articles 2-3)

In Thomas Aquinas’ theory of emotions, emotions (or ‘passiones,’ as they are called in Latin) are embedded in a larger psychological framework. They are features (or acts) of so-called appetitive powers. Contrary to apprehensive powers, which make a being cognitively apprehend something, appetitive ... see more

Pleasure (Peter of Abano, Expositio problematum Aristotelis, Chapter 38, Problem 7)

In his commentary on the Problemata (which were usually misattributed to Aristotle), Peter of Abano addresses the question of why the term ‘incontinence’ (incontinentia) is employed for pleasures (delectationes) deriving from touch and taste, but not from smelling, sight, and hearing. One suggestion... see more

Friendship, Enmity, and Fear (Albert the Great, Quaestiones super De animalibus, Book 8, Questions 1–3)

In his question commentary on Aristotle’s writings on animals, Albert the Great also raises some questions regarding the emotional life of animals. Although friendship and enmity, which are the topics of questions 1 and 2 of book 8, do not strictly speaking qualify as emotions, it is clear that they... see more

Hope and Despair (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Part I-II, Question 40, Article 3)

In Summa theologiae I-II.40.3, Thomas Aquinas discusses whether nonhuman animals possess the emotion of hope (spes) and despair (desperatio). According to his division of emotions, humans have hope when they try to attain a good that is absent but attainable. Despair, by contrast, is felt when one l... see more

Enjoyment (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Part I-II, Question 11, Article 2)

In his Summa theologiae, Thomas Aquinas also raises fundamental psychological questions that go beyond the field of theology. One of these questions concerns the character of enjoyment (fruitio) and its possible existence in nonhuman animals. From a folk psychological point of view, it seems obvious... see more

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