Abstract
Davidsonâs 1974 argument denying the possibility of incommensurable conceptual schemes is widely interpreted as entailing a denial of metaphysical pluralism. Speakers may group objects differently or have different beliefs about the world, but there is just one world. I argue there is tension arising from three aspects of Davidsonâs philosophy: the 1974 argument against conceptual schemes; Davidsonâs more recent emphasis on primitive triangulation as a necessary condition for thought and language; and Davidsonâs semantic approach to metaphysics, what he calls âthe method of truth in metaphysicsâ. After elucidating the tension, I argue the tension can be resolved while preserving at least two major tenets of Davidsonâs philosophy: conceptual schemes do not carve an uninterpreted reality into different worlds and truth is objective and non-epistemic. I argue Davidson is implicitly committed to a plurality of worlds