How not to defeat skepticism: Why antirealism won't do the trick

Philosophical Forum 43 (2):127-151 (2012)
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10.1111/j.1467-9191.2012.00414.x

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A Deweyan Defense of Truth and Fallibilism.Frank X. Ryan - 2024 - Contemporary Pragmatism 21 (1):5-52.

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