Abstract

From a philosophical point of view, the concept of Willkür is highly problem-atic. Although the word »Willkür« can be originally translated as »choice of the will«, which means a kind of indi-vidual freedom, it has, over the last 300 years, experienced a semantic pejora-tion, and now often stands for mere »arbitrariness«. The article examines the philosophical ambivalence of the concept of Willkür. It defends this con-cept from the charge that it is no con-sistent thought and rehabilitates it both historically and systematically. First, it exposes the pre-Kantian concept of the »liberum arbitrium voluntatis« in Augustine, Aquinas, and Leibniz’ »franc arbitre«, which demonstrate the positive sense of the concept. Then it explores the systematic role of Willkürin Kant’s philosophical work. Finally, it addresses contemporary attempts to revitalize this concept in the analytic debate on freedom.