Philosophical Review 120 (3):383-421 (2011)

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Abstract
This article examines Aristotle's model of deliberation as inquiry (zêtêsis), arguing that Aristotle does not treat the presumption of open alternatives as a precondition for rational deliberation. Deliberation aims to uncover acts that are up to us and conducive to our ends; it essentially consists in causal mapping. Unlike the comparative model presupposed in the literature on deliberation, Aristotle's model can account for the virtuous agent's deliberation, as well as deliberation with a view to “satisficing” desires and deliberation that fails to uncover any expedient course of action. Aristotle's account of the constraints governing rational deliberation is furthermore not incompatibilist—for all Aristotle says, we may deliberate rationally despite being committed to the truth of determinism
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-1263683
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References found in this work BETA

Deliberation and the Presumption of Open Alternatives.Tomis Kapitan - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):230.
Van Inwagen on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 2001 - In Joseph K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Determinism with Deliberation.Philip Pettit - 1989 - Analysis 49 (1):42 - 44.
From Necessity to Fate: A Fallacy.Sarah Broadie - 2001 - The Journal of Ethics 5 (1):21-37.
The Scope of Deliberation: A Conflict in Aquinas.T. H. Irwin - 1990 - Review of Metaphysics 44 (1):21 - 42.

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Sceptical Deliberations.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):383-408.

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