Abstract

Is a causal account of human action possible? Or does the explanation of human action require that we utilize concepts and categories not sufficiently explained by causal concepts? If a causal account is possible, does it necessarily succeed only at the expense of eliminating the distinctive features of human action, such as intentionality and purpose? These questions provide the motivation for this investigation into the nature and explanation of human action. My position is, in short, that a causal theory of human action is a coherent view with strong arguments in its favor. I contend as well that one can preserve, within this context, the distinctive features of genuinely human action. ;This project is divided into six sections. The first is an introduction, emphasizing the conflict between two traditional models of human action, which Georg Henrik von Wright calls the Galilean, dominated by causal and mechanistic categories, and the Aristotelian, characterized by teleological or finalistic concepts. In beginning the attempt to overcome the tension between these two models, I first discuss in chapter two the nature of causation. I examine in detail the Humean, covering-law, logical entailment, and agency or interventionalist analyses, and offer reasons why each fails. I proceed to develop a version of a sufficient condition theory, distinct from J. L. Mackie's well-known version and from the necessary-and-sufficient-condition analysis of Richard Taylor. ;On the basis of my analysis of causation, I next address, in chapter three, the question whether reasons are causes of the actions that proceed from them. I respond to several well-known arguments against this identification, including the conceptual connection argument , and the argument from the essential generality of causal explanations. These arguments, I contend, do not have their intended force. In chapter four, I use several examples to show that explanations of actions in terms of beliefs, motives, and desires in fact fit the pattern of explanations which are straight-forwardly causal. These two chapters represent, in short, a negative and a positive task: the negative task of showing that the anti-causal arguments do not go through, and the positive one of showing that what I call complete action-explanations proceed as do causal explanations. ;In chapter five, I push the argument one step further, arguing for the causal determination of human action, in the sense that, if an action is explainable, there must be a set of conditions sufficient for that action. I argue also that this causal determinism of human action--I call it "rational determinism"--does not neglect or eliminate the distinctively human features of action, such as intentionality, purpose, and rationality. ;Finally, in chapter six, after summarizing my argument, I suggest that problems and difficulties remain to be examined, especially with regard to the issue of responsibility