Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):3 – 26 (2004)

Abstract
This paper develops an empirical argument that the rejection of moral objectivity leaves important features of moral judgment intact. In each of five reported experiments, a number of participants endorsed a nonobjectivist claim about a canonical moral violation. In four of these experiments, participants were also given a standard measure of moral judgment, the moral/conventional task. In all four studies, participants who respond as nonobjectivists about canonical moral violations still treat such violations in typical ways on the moral/conventional task. In particular, participants who give moral nonobjectivist responses still draw a clear distinction between canonical moral and conventional violations. Thus there is some reason to think that many of the central characteristics of moral judgment are preserved in the absence of a commitment to moral objectivity.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/0951508042000202354
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,979
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Moral Problem.Michael Smith (ed.) - 1994 - Wiley.

View all 39 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.

View all 59 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
174 ( #67,288 of 2,504,877 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #209,949 of 2,504,877 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes