Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910 (2015)

Victor Kumar
Boston University
In this essay I argue that moral judgment is a natural kind by developing an empirically grounded theory of the distinctive conceptual content of moral judgments. Psychological research on the moral/conventional distinction suggests that in moral judgments right and wrong, good and bad, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, etc. are conceptualized as serious, general, authority-independent, and objective. After laying out the theory and the empirical evidence that supports it, I address recent empirical and conceptual objections. Finally, I suggest that the theory uniquely accounts for the possibility of genuine moral agreement and disagreement
Keywords Moral judgment  Natural kind  Homeostasis  Moral/conventional distinction  Social morality  Moral objectivity  Moral disagreement
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0448-7
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

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