Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910 (2015)
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Abstract |
In this essay I argue that moral judgment is a natural kind by developing an empirically grounded theory of the distinctive conceptual content of moral judgments. Psychological research on the moral/conventional distinction suggests that in moral judgments right and wrong, good and bad, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, etc. are conceptualized as serious, general, authority-independent, and objective. After laying out the theory and the empirical evidence that supports it, I address recent empirical and conceptual objections. Finally, I suggest that the theory uniquely accounts for the possibility of genuine moral agreement and disagreement
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Keywords | Moral judgment Natural kind Homeostasis Moral/conventional distinction Social morality Moral objectivity Moral disagreement |
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DOI | 10.1007/s11098-015-0448-7 |
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References found in this work BETA
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Rational Learners and Metaethics: Universalism, Relativism, and Evidence From Consensus.Alisabeth Ayars & Shaun Nichols - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (1):67-89.
Animal Morality: What is the Debate About?Simon Fitzpatrick - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (6):1151-1183.
The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment.Joshua May - 2018 - In Karen Jones & Francois Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford University Press. pp. 286-306.
View all 19 citations / Add more citations
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