Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):128-159 (2007)

Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington
Recent third person approaches to thought experiments and conceptual analysis through the method of surveys are motivated by and motivate skepticism about the traditional first person method. I argue that such surveys give no good ground for skepticism, that they have some utility, but that they do not represent a fundamentally new way of doing philosophy, that they are liable to considerable methodological difficulties, and that they cannot be substituted for the first person method, since the a priori knowledge which is our object in conceptual analysis can be acquired only from the first person standpoint.
Keywords Thought Experiments  Intuitions  Experimental Philosophy  Conceptual Analysis  Case Method in Philosophy
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DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00160.x
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.

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The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.

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