Quasi-Truth, Supervaluations and Free Logic

History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (3-4):215-226 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The partial structures approach has two major components: a broad notion of structure (partial structure) and a weak notion of truth (quasi-truth). In this paper, we discuss the relationship between this approach and free logic. We also compare the model-theoretic analysis supplied by partial structures with the method of supervaluations, which was initially introduced as a technique to provide a semantic analysis of free logic. We then combine the three formal frameworks (partial structures, free logic and supervaluations), and apply the resulting approach to accommodate semantic paradoxes

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,423

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Quasi-truth in quasi-set theory.Otávio Bueno - 2000 - Synthese 125 (1-2):33-53.
Supervaluations and the propositional attitude constraint.J. A. Burgess - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):103-119.
On supervaluations in free logic.Peter W. Woodruff - 1984 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (3):943-950.
Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Presuppositions: Supervaluations and Free Logic.B. C. van Fraassen - 1969 - In K. Lambert (ed.), The Logical Way of Doing Things. Yale University Press. pp. 67-92.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
69 (#232,586)

6 months
7 (#418,426)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.
On the Plurality of Worlds.James E. Tomberlin - 1989 - Noûs 23 (1):117-125.

View all 30 references / Add more references