Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):103-119 (1997)

For the sentences of languages that contain operators that express the concepts of definiteness and indefiniteness, there is an unavoidable tension between a truth-theoretic semantics that delivers truth conditions for those sentences that capture their propositional contents and any model-theoretic semantics that has a story to tell about how indetifiniteness in a constituent affects the semantic value of sentences which imbed it. But semantic theories of both kinds play essential roles, so the tension needs to be resolved. I argue that it is the truth theory which correctly characterises the notion of truth, per se. When we take into account the considerations required to bring model theory into harmony with truth theory, those considerations undermine the arguments standardly used to motivate supervaluational model theories designed to validate classical logic. But those considerations also show that celebration would be premature for advocates of the most frequently encountered rival approach - many-valued model theory
Keywords Philosophy
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DOI 10.1023/A:1017935214210
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
General Semantics.David K. Lewis - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67.
Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.

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Citations of this work BETA

Vagueness, Epistemicism and Response-Dependence.J. Burgess - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):507 – 524.
What is Minimalism About Truth?J. A. Burgess - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):259-267.

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