Inferentialism and Structuralism: A Tale of Two Theories

Logique Et Analyse 61 (244):489-512 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper aims to unite two seemingly disparate themes in the philosophy of mathematics and language respectively, namely ante rem structuralism and inferentialism. My analysis begins with describing both frameworks in accordance with their genesis in the work of Hilbert. I then draw comparisons between these philosophical views in terms of their similar motivations and similar objections to the referential orthodoxy. I specifically home in on two points of comparison, namely the role of norms and the relation of ontological dependence in both accounts. Lastly, I show that insights from this purported connection can address certain objections to both theories respectively.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,628

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Making it totally explicit.Janice L. Dowell - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (2):137-170.
Inferentialism, Conceptualism, and Social Pragmatism.Jih-Ching Ho - 2002 - NTU Philosophical Review 25:137-175.
Meaning and inference.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2003 - In Timothy Childers & Ondrej Majer (eds.), Logica Yearbook 2002. Filosofia.
Pragmatism and inferentialism.John MacFarlane - 2010 - In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explici. Routledge. pp. 81--95.
Say My Name. An Objection to Ante Rem Structuralism.Tim Räz - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (1):116-125.
Mathematical structuralism today.Julian C. Cole - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):689-699.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-07-25

Downloads
72 (#227,379)

6 months
18 (#139,566)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ryan Mark Nefdt
University of Cape Town

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

The logical basis of metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Natural deduction: a proof-theoretical study.Dag Prawitz - 1965 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.
Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.

View all 45 references / Add more references