Wittgenstein on the existence of the mind in the physical world

In Anja Weiberg Stefan Majetschak (ed.), Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 181-182 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper I shall explore Wittgenstein’s view on the existence of mind. The main concern is in this paper to give a positive theory of mind which can provide a method for understanding mind as a metaphysical reality. In this context the self is presupposed by which what we call the mental phenomena including consciousness, because without the self the mind will be meaningless in this physical world. That is, this phenomenon of world itself needs a self in which mind is the part of this phenomenal world. As Wittgenstein takes mind in continuation with language and world because, for him, mind is not an independent entity in this world, rather it is part of this world. Thus the existence of the mind itself in this physical world proves that mind is metaphysical.

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Rajakishore Nath
Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay

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