Abstract

The dissertation examines a feature of phenomenalist aesthetics with reference to the relevant works of Monroe Beardsley, It centers on Beardsley's analysis of the work of art as a phenomenal object and argues that in the case of the pictorial arts, Beardsley's position in regard to the nature of the work of art, when combined with his anti-intentionalistic stance in art criticism, leads to the obliteration of the distinction between the natural and the artificial aesthetic object. The obfuscation of the distinction has the untoward consequence of rendering the critical activity of interpretation of meaning theoretically unjustifiable, for only intentional products can have meaning. It is the intentional nature of the work of art which makes it a meaningful object and hence a candidate for interpretation. In view of this point, the dissertation analyses Beardsley's theory of meaning in pictorial art and argues that a theory of meaning based on the model of meaning in language is inapplicable to meaning in the case of pictorial art. ;Finally, the dissertation examines Beardsley's view of intention as a mental event which is separate from the work and analyses the notion of artifactuality in order to formulate a view of intention which is in conformity with the processes of creating a work and emphasizes the nature of the work as an intentional object